This article develops an analytic framework to analyze the tradeoff between economic efficiency and distributional equity in targeting payments for ecosystem services (PES). It also proposes an empirical procedure to trace out the efficiency-equity frontier, where the program is Pareto optimal in the sense that it cannot be improved upon to achieve either higher efficiency or distributional equity without compromising the other. We apply the procedure to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest PES program in U.S. history, to analyze (a) whether it is possible to improve both the efficiency and the distributional equity of the program, and (b) what the choice made by CRP administrators implies about the political-economic balance. Results reveal that (a) CRP administrators forfeited about 9% of efficiency for an 18%-23% improvement in distributional equity, depending on the equity indicator used, in the eighteenth signup of the CRP; (b) reducing the maximum allowable rental rate for all contracts would improve efficiency at the cost of distributional equity; (c) reducing the maximum county enrollment cap would reduce efficiency without generating much improvement in distributional equity; and (d) the CRP targeting criterion could be redesigned to achieve both higher efficiency and higher distributional equity.
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) have become a major vehicle for resource conservation and environmental protection (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 2007). Indeed, PES programs often have multiple objectives, including environmental benefit maximization and broad program participation (Hellerstein and Higgins 2010; Zilberman, Lipper, and McCarthy 2008) . While benefit maximization can be justified based on economic criteria, broad program participation or spreading program benefits over broad geographic areas, such as congressional districts, can be pursued for political support or social welfare considerations (Adger et al. 2003; Brown and Corbera 2003) . The questions are: How compatible are economic and political objectives in targeting payments for ecosystem services? Can a program achieve higher equity without compromising its efficiency? How to measure the compatibility of economic and political objectives? In this article we develop an analytic framework to address these questions and apply it to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest PES program in U.S. history in terms of both the amount of land conserved and the total program cost.
The CRP was established by the Food Security Act of 1985 and was reauthorized in all subsequent farm bills, and has been administrated by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). The two primary goals of the CRP are to conserve marginal cropland for ecosystem services and to provide farm income support. Under the CRP, farmers convert environmentally sensitive land to resource-conserving covers, such as native grasses, trees, and filter strips. In return, farmers receive an annual rental payment from the government for a contract period of between ten and fifteen years (Sullivan et al. 2004) . Enrollment in the CRP reached its historical high of 36.8 million acres in 2007, and had declined to 23.7 million acres at an annual cost of $1.7 billion, as of February 2016 (USDA Farm Service Agency 2016).
The CRP generates substantial economic and environmental benefits (Sullivan et al. 2004; Wu and Lin 2010) . Nationwide, the CRP was credited with reducing soil erosion by nearly 224 million tons a year, or approximately 6.8 tons per CRP acre (Sullivan et al. 2004) . The CRP also generated significant water quality benefit (Hellerstein and Higgins 2010) . In some agricultural regions, the CRP reduced nitrate loadings by over 90%, sediment and herbicide loadings by 50%, and phosphorous loadings by 30% (Weitman 1994) . Many wildlife species benefited from the CRP land, including ring-necked pheasants, elk, deer, and eastern cottontail rabbits (Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen 1999) . The annual economic benefits from the reduced soil erosion and increased recreational opportunities alone amounted to $1.6 billion or $49 per CRP acre (Sullivan et al. 2004) .
Land in the CRP and the accrued economic and environmental benefits are highly concentrated in the Great Plains, from Texas to Montana (USDA Economic Research Service 2015). However, broad program participation has been an important policy goal of the CRP (Hellerstein and Higgins 2010) . Thus, the USDA would prefer to spread CRP enrollments over a wider geographic area. In addition, CRP acreage has decreased by 36% from its historical high because of high commodity prices and the increased emphasis on working land conservation in recent years (Hellerstein and Malcolm 2011) .
1 This decline may continue because the 2014 Farm Bill reduced the conservation budget by $4 billion, or 7% of the total projected ten-year outlay (Chite 2014) . Furthermore, contracts for millions of acres of CRP land will expire in the next few years. How new contracts or expiring contracts will be selected for renewal will have important implications on the programs' economic, environmental, and distributional impacts.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, it analyzes whether it is possible to improve both the efficiency and the distributional equity of the CRP, and second, it assesses what the choice made by CRP administrators implies about the politicaleconomic balance. To this end, we develop an analytical framework that allows us to trace the efficiency-equity frontier (EEF), where the program is Pareto optimal in the sense that it cannot be improved upon to achieve higher efficiency or higher equity without compromising the other. If the current allocation is below the EEF, it would be possible to improve both the efficiency and the equity of the program. Previous studies tend to focus on the tradeoff between efficiency and equity when moving from one policy scheme to another without analyzing their performance relative to the EEF, and thus do not address the fundamental issue of whether it is possible to achieve a win-win scenario.
Our results reveal that the efficiency and equity outcomes of the CRP were below the EEFs, and CRP dollars could be reallocated to achieve win-win scenarios on the EEF. Specifically, the CRP could achieve both higher efficiency and higher equity by reducing CRP acres in counties with the highest rental rates in the Corn Belt and lake states, and in counties with the highest CRP concentrations in the northern and southern plains. However, CRP administrators face a tradeoff if they can only adjust the existing policy levers to achieve higher efficiency or higher equity. The choices made by CRP administrators imply that they forfeited 9% of efficiency for a 18%-23% improvement in equity, depending on the equity indicator used, in the eighteenth signup of the CRP.
Targeting for Efficiency and Distributional Equity
Efficiency and distributional equity are important considerations for policy design and evaluation (Goulder and Parry 2008; World Bank 2008) . Some previous studies have analyzed their compatibility (e.g., Azzi and Cox 1973; Ferraro 2003 ; Alix-Garcia, Janvry, and Sadoulet 2004) . These studies tend to compare different policy schemes for their efficiency and equity outcomes, rather than analyzing their performance relative to the EEF. For example, Alix-Garcia, Janvry, and Sadoulet (2004) compare the performance of two payment schemes and find that the flat payment scheme provides more equity, but less environmental benefit than the riskweighted scheme. However, a finding of tradeoffs does not necessarily mean that a win-win scenario is impossible because both schemes may be located inside the EEF, as illustrated by moving from point a to point b in figure 1 .
The issue of efficiency-equity compatibility is not unique to PES; many public programs face the same issue (Jones 2009 ). For example, Levy, Wilson, and Zwack (2007) estimate the health benefits of air pollution control strategies for power plants and find that the strategy that generates more health benefits also reduces health risk inequality. Dietz and Atkinson (2010) use the statedpreference model to elicit individual preference over equity-efficiency tradeoffs in the context of air pollution and global climate change and find that there is "an apparent willingness to tradeoff between the principle which guides property right allocation and that for income distribution." Alene et al. (2009) compare the research expenditure allocation across agricultural commodities based on efficiency and equity criteria and find no significant efficiency and equity tradeoffs in the agricultural research in Nigeria.
Several studies have analyzed tradeoffs between alternative environmental benefits when targeting land for conservation (Babcock et al. 1996; Plantinga and Wu 2003; Nelson et al. 2008) . For example, Babcock et al. (1996) compare the amount of environmental benefits (water erosion, wind erosion, surface water quality, and wildlife habitat) obtained under three alternative targeting criteria and find that a targeting criterion that generates more of one benefit (e.g., soil erosion reduction) may generate less of other benefits (e.g., wildlife habitat). Likewise, Nelson et al. (2008) compare the performance of policy incentives designed to increase the provision of carbon sequestration and species conservation in the Willamette Basin, Oregon, and find that policies aimed at increasing the provision of carbon sequestration do not necessarily increase species conservation. Plantinga and Wu (2003) estimate the reduction in agricultural externalities (soil erosion and nitrogen and atrazine pollution) from an afforestation policy targeted for carbon sequestration and find that these "co-benefits" are the same order of magnitude as the costs of the carbon sequestration policy. Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock (2001) develop a theoretical framework to analyze the economic, environmental, and distributional impacts of alternative targeting criteria and find that there may be tradeoffs between these impacts when one targeting criterion is switched to another.
Targeting is also emphasized in the reserve site selection literature. The objective in
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Figure 1. Efficiency-equity frontier (EEF) many studies in this literature is to select reserves to maximize the number of protected species for a given reserve area (e.g., Kirkpatrick 1983; Vane-Wright, Humphries, and Williams 1991; Fischer and Church 2003; € Onal and Briers 2003) . However, species benefits hinge on spatial attributes (e.g., networks and agglomeration) that introduce interaction effects with equity outcomes (Babcock et al. 1996) . Although many economic studies (e.g., Ando et al. 1998; Costello and Polasky 2004; Newburn, Berck, and Merenlender 2006; Polasky et al. 2008 ) have contributed to the reserve site selection literature by considering the opportunity costs of land conservation, they have not examined the efficiency-equity tradeoffs in reserve site selections. Furthermore, little research, to the best of our knowledge, has assessed the performance of conservation policies relative to EEFs. This paper fills that gap in the literature by developing an analytical framework of EEFs and applying it to the CRP.
Analytical Framework
In this section we first discuss the measurement of efficiency and equity and then present an analytical framework to analyze their tradeoff. Finally, we present an algorithm for tracing EEFs.
Measurement of Efficiency and Equity
Both efficiency and equity can be defined and measured in multiple ways. In the literature, efficiency is usually discussed in terms of policy outcomes with respect to policy goals. For example, efficiency of conservation programs is often discussed in terms of environmental benefits achieved with certain conservation investment (e.g., Ferraro 2003; Alix-Garcia, Janvry, and Sadoulet 2004 (Adger et al. 2003; World Bank 2008) . Policymakers may also pursue it for social welfare considerations because society prefers equitable public program outcomes (Jones 2009; Adger et al. 2001 ). Distributional equity is not unique to PES; many public programs, such as public health care (World Health Organization 2016) and development programs, pursue this objective (Jones 2009 ). Brown and Corbera (2003) focus on equity as a key component of sustainable development and propose a threetiered equity framework to measure equity in decision-making, equity in access, and equity in outcome from the program. To Brown and Corbera, equity concerns both fairness of development outcomes and inclusion in the processes of decision-making for development.
In this study we focus on equity in access and equity in outcome because the CRP is a voluntary program authorized by the law and managed by the USDA. The CRP uses a bidding mechanism to select land for conservation. Interested landowners offer a parcel of land for enrollment in the CRP, with proposed conservation practices and a rental rate. The offered parcels (bids) are ranked and selected according to the Environmental Benefit Index (EBI), which is comprised of a benefit score and a cost score. The benefit score measures environmental benefits generated by the parcel after it is retired from crop production, including benefits from soil erosion reduction, water quality protection, and wildlife habit conservation. The cost score penalizes bids that request higher rental rates. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the EBI and its limitations.
Equity in access measures the extent to which landowners have equal access to the program. We construct four indicators to measure equity in access, based on the percentage of proposed land accepted into the CRP, acres of land proposed for CRP per capita of rural farm population (reflecting eligibility), requested rental payment per capita of rural farm population, and environmental benefits per capita if all submitted bids were accepted. We also construct five indicators to measure equity in outcomes based on the geographic distribution of CRP payment and CRP environmental benefits. Some of the indicators are normalized by rural farm population or farmland area, and others by total population. Because the CRP is funded by taxpayers, how CRP benefits are distributed among the general population is also relevant from an equity perspective. All the equity-inoutcome and equity-in-access indicators are summarized in table 1.
Each of the equity indicators is constructed as a Gini coefficient. 2 For example, equityin-outcome indicator 1, measured based on the CRP payment per capita of rural farm population, is defined by:
! where x i is the CRP payment per capita of rural farm population in unit i (e.g., a county or a congressional district), k i is the ranking of unit i among all units in non-descending order by x i , and n is the total number of units.
Further, E ranges from zero to one; it equals zero when all CRP payments are concentrated in one unit, and equals one when CRP payments per capita of rural farm population are equalized among all units. Other equity indicators are constructed similarly. Because most of the data needed for this analysis are unavailable below the county level, we can only construct indicators to measure how "equitably" CRP benefits are distributed among counties or congressional districts. Thus, our indicators do not capture benefit distribution within a county. However, our framework can be applied to a smaller unit (e.g., a farm or household) when appropriate data are available. In addition, we examine how CRP payments are distributed among low-income counties in the empirical analysis.
Efficiency-Equity Frontier
To formally define the efficiency-equity frontier (EEF), we consider a heterogeneous landscape where some land is offered for conservation as in the CRP. Let y denote the per-acre output if the land is used in production, and let b denote the per-acre environmental benefit (e.g., tons of soil erosion reduced) if the parcel is conserved or retired from crop production. Let environmental benefit obtained in county i under the program equals
The total output and the total production cost in county i equal
The total program payment to landowners in county i equals , where z i is the rural farm population in county i.
The EEF for equity-in-outcome indicator 1 is formally defined by the following maximization problem:
ð7Þ s:t:
where M is the program budget, and E is a targeted level of equity. Solving the maximization problem without the equity constraint (8) gives the most efficient allocation. We denote the corresponding benefit level as B max and the corresponding equity level as E 0 . As the desired equity level ( E) increases above E 0 and equity constraint (8) becomes binding, the efficiency level, measured by H B=B max , decreases (at least cannot increase). The solution of the optimization problem (6)- (9) defines H as a function of equity
, which represents the EEF. In reality, there may exist inefficient programs (e.g., point a in figure 1) with equity levels below E 0 . Also, the EEF may end before E reaches one because of the inequitable distribution of eligible lands. By comparing the current allocation with the EEF, we can address the question of whether it is possible to redesign the program to improve both its efficiency and equity.
Empirical Procedure for Constructing EEFs
The EEFs can be traced empirically using a heuristic approach. As shown in appendix B, the most efficient allocation (i.e., point c in figure 1) can be achieved by accepting bids into the program according to the benefitcost ratio. Starting from this point, we can try to improve equity by redistributing a small amount of budget (DM) from one county to another. There are numerous ways to redistribute DM. Below we describe how to identify the redistribution so that we can move from one point to another on the EEF. Let DH and DE denote the change in efficiency and equity, respectively, as a result of one such redistribution. Any reallocation that leads to a reduction in equity will not be on the EEF because moving from there to point c would improve both efficiency and equity. Thus, only relocations that result in DE ! 0 should be considered. By the definition of the EEF,
Thus, the redistribution that leads to the smallest efficiency loss for a given level of equity gain is on the EFF. This suggests the following algorithm for tracing EEFs:
Step 1. Identify the most efficient allocation by selecting the bids with the highest benefitcost ratio until the budget is exhausted, and then calculate the corresponding efficiency and equity level. Use this as the starting point of the simulation.
Step 2. Start from the most efficient allocation, redistribute DM from county i to county j for any i 6 ¼ j with x i > x j , and calculate changes in equity and efficiency for each reallocation.
For a total of n counties, there are n Â n À 1 ð Þ possible ways of transfer. However, to improve equity, DM must be transferred from a county with higher CRP payment per capita to a county with lower CRP payment per capita (i.e., x i > x j ). Thus, the number of feasible transfers is only n Â ðn À 1Þ=2.
For each feasible redistribution from county i to county j, we need to decide which bids in county i should be de-funded and which bids in county j funded. To increase equity at the least expense of efficiency loss, it is necessary to minimize benefit loss in county i and maximize benefit gain in county j. This requires DM to be taken from the bids with the lowest benefit-cost ratio among the accepted bids in county i, and be given to the bids with the highest benefit-cost ratio among all the rejected bids in the county j. Once the redistribution is completed, calculate the marginal rate of substitution for the redistribution by
Step 3. Identify the reallocation on the EEF by choosing the one that generates the minimum MRS: This requires repeating step 2 for all feasible reallocations and choosing the one with the minimum MRS:
Step 4. Treat the reallocation on the EEF as a new starting point and iterate steps 2-3 until equity cannot be improved.
We demonstrate the application of this algorithm by tracing EEFs for the CRP.
Moving from the Current Allocation to the EEF
If the current allocation is below the EEF, we can use the EEF-tracing algorithm to determine the reallocation needed for achieving a desired point on the EEF. To trace the EEF, the algorithm must determine the allocation for achieving each point on the EEF. Thus, by comparing the current allocation with a desired allocation on the EEF, we can determine the reallocation needed to achieve that desired allocation.
If the current allocation is below the EEF, a win-win scenario is possible. Some of the more desired allocations include (a) the allocation that achieves higher efficiency without compromising equity (vertical move to the EEF); (b) the allocation that achieves higher equity without compromising efficiency (horizontal move to the EEF); and (c) a winwin allocation (i.e., move to any point on the EEF between the two allocations identified in (a) and (b)). Our EEF-tracing algorithm can be used to determine the reallocation needed to achieve any of the allocations on the EEF.
Efficiency-Equity Balance Implied by Policy Decisions
Without an appropriate algorithm, it would be difficult to determine the most efficient allocation for achieving a certain level of distributional equity. In addition, program administrators are often constrained by existing policy instruments, targeting rules, or institutional capacity. Therefore, in many cases program administrators can only improve equity by adjusting available policy levers. In the case of the CRP, the USDA can influence the pattern of enrollment via only three policy levers: (a) the weight placed on the cost component of the EBI (i.e., w in equation (A2) in appendix A); (b) the highest allowable rental rate (i.e., max.r in equation (A2) in appendix A); and (c) the county enrollment cap, which is currently set at 25% of the total cropland acreage in the county. There is evidence to indicate that the USDA has adjusted some of the policy levers to better reflect current conservation priorities or to spread CRP acres over a wider geographic area (Claassen 2008; USDA Farm Service Agency 2003) . In this article we construct the efficiency-equity tradeoff curves faced by USDA administrators as they try to adjust these policy levers to improve equity for the CRP. The choices made by CRP administrators reveal their political-economic balance.
After bids are submitted, CRP administrators can influence the pattern of enrollment via the weight placed on the cost component of the EBI. For a given cost weight, CRP administrators rank the bids according to their EBI scores and accept the bids into the program until the budget is exhausted. The corresponding level of equity can be calculated by equation (1), and the corresponding level of efficiency can be measured by the total environmental benefit obtained for the budget relative to the maximum environmental benefit achievable. By repeating the procedure for different cost weights, we can trace the efficiency-equity tradeoff curve faced by CRP administrators as they place different weights on the cost component of the EBI.
We can also construct the efficiency-equity tradeoff curve faced by CRP administrators as they choose the maximum allowable rental rate for all contracts. Although the weight placed on the cost component of the EBI is unknown to landowners before they submit a bid, the maximum allowable rental rate is announced before each signup. Thus, changing the maximum allowable rental rate may affect efficiency and equity in three possible ways: (a) by changing the pool of offered parcels; (b) by changing rental rates requested for the offered parcels; and (c) by changing the bids accepted into the program by changing the EBI scores of the bids. Specifically, with an increase in the maximum rental rate, some landowners who did not make an offer before might be encouraged to submit a bid. In contrast, with a reduction in the maximum rental rate, some bidding farmers might not have submitted a bid at all; others might have adjusted their bid rents in response to the reduction in the rental rate cap.
Without information about other eligible parcels that are not in the pool of bids, it is difficult to examine how increasing the maximum rental rate would affect the pool of offered parcels. However, by using results from Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) , we can estimate adjustments in the requested rental rates and examine which bids would not have been submitted or accepted into the program when CRP administrators reduced the maximum rental rate. Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) estimate that a one-point increase in the EBI score increases the requested rents by $0.052 to $0.076 per acre for CRP signup 18. Using results from Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) , we estimate adjustments in requested rental rates for each submitted bid when the maximum rental payment is reduced.
3 If a landowner's adjusted rental rate is above the reduced maximum allowable rental rate, we assume the landowner would not have submitted the bid or his bid would not have been selected. With the adjustments in rental rates and the bid pool and the new EBI scores for each bid in the pool, we can construct the efficiency-equity tradeoff curve faced by CRP program administrators as they reduce the maximum rental rate.
We can also construct the efficiency-equity tradeoff curve faced by CRP administrators as they reduce the county enrollment cap, which is currently set at 25% of the total cropland in the county. Because reducing the county enrollment cap is likely to discourage participation, the pool of bids may be smaller with a reduced county enrollment cap, particularly in counties with enrollments close to the cap. To determine the new pool under a reduced enrollment cap, we assume that landowners with lower EBI scores are more likely to be discouraged to submit a bid. This implies that the bids with the lowest EBI scores would not be submitted or if they are submitted, they will not be accepted if the total enrollment is above the reduced cap. With these assumptions, we can construct the efficiency-equity tradeoff curve faced by CRP administrators as they reduce the county enrollment cap. 4 In addition to the EBI targeting, three alternative targeting regimes have been used to select resources for conservation in the past, including cost targeting (i.e., target resources with lowest per-unit cost), benefit targeting (i.e., target resources that offer the largest environmental benefit per resource unit), and benefit-cost ratio targeting (i.e., target resources with the highest benefit-cost ratio; Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock 2001) . The performance of these targeting criteria can also be assessed by the distance from their efficiency-equity outcomes to the EEF.
Data and Sensitivity Analysis
To demonstrate the value of our framework, we apply it to the CRP. Specifically, we use data on individual bids for CRP Signup 18 in the analysis. The data include 89,886 individual bids submitted from 2,015 counties in fortythree states. Each submitted bid specifies the size of the proposed parcel, the EBI scores (six categories), and rental payment requested. In 3 The change in requested rent is estimated by solving for Dr from the equation Dr ¼ bDEBI ¼ b h max:r þ Dmax:r; r þ Dr ð Þ À h max:r; r ð Þ ½ ; where b is the change in the requested rental rate as the EBI score increases by one point, and is taken from Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) . Specifically, solving the equation gives Dr as a function of Dmax:r: total, 61,219 bids were accepted into the CRP based on EBI scores, with an annual rental cost of approximately $225 million. Most of the contracts were signed in 2000 and covered the period 2000-2010. The distribution of the selected bids is quite uneven spatially. The Corn Belt has the highest average environmental benefit score (182), but also has the highest rental payment per acre ($82). The Delta States region has the lowest average environmental benefit score (150). The Mountain Area has the lowest rental cost per acre ($34). On average, the Mountain Area has the highest benefit-cost ratio (5.1), while the Corn Belt has the lowest benefit-cost ratio (2.4).
5
Other data used in the analysis include total personal income, net farm income gain, rural farm and general population, and federal income tax payment. The sources for these county-level data are documented in the footnotes of the tables that use the data.
Theoretically, an infinitesimal amount of payment DM should be redistributed at a time to trace the EEF. But the magnitude of DM affects the time required to simulate a one-time transfer, the total number of iterations, and the precision of the simulation results. As DM decreases, it requires more time to generate an EEF. When DM is too small, it would become computationally infeasible because of the large amount of time required.
To determine the appropriate magnitude of DM, we test the simulations with a subsample containing 200 counties to examine the precision loss by increasing DM. The results are reported in the online supplementary appendix for equity-in-outcome indicator 1. As DM increases, the EEF moves down, reflecting increasing loss in efficiency for an improvement in equity. The EEF for DM¼ $50,000 is much less precise than the EEF's for DM ¼$1,000, $5,000, or $10,000. As for the simulating time, with full sample, a simulation of a one-time transfer takes 208, 164, 126, and fifty-six seconds for DM¼$1,000, $5,000, $10,000, and $50,000, respectively. Considering both the precision and time requirement, we choose DM¼$10,000 for the simulation, which is 0.004% of the total fund. It takes approximately 200 hours to trace one EEF with the full sample.
We also tested the robustness of the results with respect to the choice of study unit. The results are also reported in the online supplementary appendix for equity-inoutcome indicator 1. As expected, the EEF for congressional districts is located to the right of the EEF for counties because the equity level is higher when measured at a more aggregate level. In the rest of this paper we focus on the results that use counties as units of analysis because the general conclusions are the same when congressional districts are used.
Results
In this section we present results on (a) the efficiency and equity outcomes under the current EBI-based targeting; (b) the performance of the current EBI-based targeting relative to the EEF; (c) the performance of alternative targeting criteria; (d) the efficiency-equity balance implied by USDA decisions; and (e) paths from the current allocation to optimal allocations on the EEF.
Efficiency and Equity Outcomes of the Current EBI-Based Targeting
The efficiency and equity outcomes for the current EBI-based targeting (EBI) are reported in table 2. The efficiency level is estimated at 0.92, indicating that the current CRP targeting criterion achieves 92% of the maximum benefit. The high efficiency comes 5 Although this analysis uses data from a specific signup, the general insights gained should apply to more recent signups because the EBI-based targeting approach has not changed since it was first established in 1990. Most of the changes to the targeting criteria since then involve adjustments of the weights on different benefit categories or cost in order to reflect current conservation priorities (Claassen 2008) . Furthermore, it is straightforward to apply the framework to other signups for robustness checks when data are available.
at a cost of low equity according to most criteria. The first three equity-in-access indicators, which reflect mostly the distribution of eligible land, equal 0.21, 0.24, and 0.13, respectively, indicating that access to the CRP is highly inequitable due to the uneven distribution of eligible land across counties. The CRP aims to protect highly erodible cropland and other environmentally sensitive acres. Eligibility is defined based on soil erodibility and other physical characteristics. The uneven distribution of eligible land leads to inequity in program access. Barring the uneven distribution of eligible land, the program is quite equitable by the percentage of proposed land accepted into the program, which has an equity-in-access score of 0.72. The uneven distribution of eligible land also leads to low equity in the distribution of program benefits according to the five equity-inoutcome indicators, which are all below 0.36.
Despite the low distributional equity performance, the CRP is quite successful in targeting low-income counties. Counties in the first quartile received 58.5% of the total CRP payment (see table 3), while counties in the first decile of per-capita income receive 29.3% of the total CRP payment. More than 90% of the total CRP payment goes to the counties in the first two income quartiles. The success has more to do with the spatial distribution of eligible land and environmental benefits than with the choice of targeting criterion. As shown in table 3, the most efficient allocation would produce a similar result. The distribution of CRP payments among the four farm income gains quartiles displays a similar pattern. The Performance of the CRP Relative to the EEFs To determine if the CRP could be improved to achieve higher efficiency and higher equity, we evaluate its performance relative to the EEFs. Figure 2 shows the performance measures of the CRP relative to the EEFs for the five equity-in-outcome indicators. As predicted by the theory, the EEFs are downward sloping, indicating that higher efficiency can only be achieved at the cost of equity along the EEFs. The EEFs are also quite steep, indicating that equity gain can be obtained only at a high cost to efficiency. Figure 2 shows that, although the current CRP targeting criterion is quite efficient (it achieves 92% of the maximum environmental benefits), it can be improved. Specifically, by moving to a point on the EEF in the northeast direction, the CRP can improve both its efficiency and equity. We will discuss the reallocations needed to achieve alternative allocations on the EEFs later in this section.
The Performance of Alternative Targeting Criteria
In addition to the EBI-based targeting, cost targeting, benefit targeting, and benefit-cost ratio targeting are the most commonly suggested targeting criteria for conservation programs. Figure 3 shows the performance of these targeting criteria relative to the EEFs. As predicted by theory, benefit-cost ratio targeting, as indicated by point A in figure 3 , results in the most efficient allocation of CRP acres and funding. It is strictly preferred to cost targeting (point D), which generates both lower efficiency and lower equity, although the differences are small. Benefit targeting (point B) performs worst in terms of the distance from the EEF. The current EBIbased targeting (point C) achieves higher efficiency than benefit targeting with only a small loss in equity. Surprisingly, the current EBI-based targeting criterion is less efficient than cost targeting, although it performs better than benefit targeting. These results may reflect that, when benefit has a smaller variation and is positively correlated with cost, cost targeting and benefit-cost ratio targeting tend to generate similar results, while benefit targeting tends to perform poorly. In the case of CRP Signup 18, the Pearson correlation coefficient of cost and benefit is 0.35, and benefit has a relatively small variation, with the coefficient of variation being 0.25. In addition, cost targeting would be able to enroll much more land. So the results may also reflect that lower benefits per acre are offset by a greater number of acres under cost targeting.
It is important to note that as targeting criteria change, both the offered land and requested rental payment rates may change. However, consideration of potential endogeneity of bids should not affect the simulated performance outcomes of the alternative targeting criteria at least in the short run. From a farmer's perspective, EBI targeting can lead to the same outcome as any of the three alternative targeting criteria by choosing the appropriate cost weight for the EBI. The cost weight is unknown to farmers before submitting their bids. Figure 2 . Performance of the current allocation relative to the efficiency-equity frontiers Note: Equity is defined based on the CRP payment per capita of rural farm population. 7 However, in the long run, landowners may be able to figure out the weight placed on the cost component of the EBI if USDA consistently puts a larger weight on the cost component of the EBI or changes from the EBI targeting to the benefit-cost ratio targeting. This will encourage farmers with a larger benefitcost ratio to submit a bid, and discourage farmers with a lower benefit-cost ratio to submit. This adjustment in the pool of submitted bids may lead to an improvement in efficiency for any spatial distribution of CRP dollars (or any given level of equity) because it contains more bids with larger benefit-cost ratios. This suggests that our simulated EEFs may provide a lower bound of EEFs in the long run.
Efficiency-Equity Balance Implied by USDA Decisions
Under the current CRP rules, the USDA can influence the pattern of enrollment via only three policy levers: (a) the weight placed on the cost component of the EBI (w); (b) the maximum rental rate (max.r); and (c) the county enrollment cap (cap). Figure 4 shows the efficiency-equity tradeoffs faced by CRP administrators as they change the three policy levers. The three tradeoff curves are all located below the corresponding EEF because adjusting these policy levers would not be the most efficient way to improve distributional equity.
As shown in figure 4 , by increasing the cost weight, w, to 470, CRP administrators could have improved the program's efficiency to nearly 100%, but they chose a smaller cost weight (w ¼ 125) in Signup 18. This implies that they forfeited about 9% of efficiency for an 18%-23% improvement in equity according to equity-in-outcome indicators 1-5.
The efficiency-equity tradeoff curve faced by CRP administrators as they reduce the maximum allowable rental rate is also shown in figure 4 based on the CRP payment per capita of rural farm population. The result indicates that the CRP could improve its efficiency from 92% to about 97% by reducing the maximum allowable rental rate by 50% (from $165/acre to $82.5/acre). As shown by the EBI formula, a reduction in the maximum rental rate reduces the EBI score, which, according to Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) , would lead to a reduction in the requested rental rates. The reduction in the requested rental rates would lead to an improvement in efficiency. In addition, as shown by the EBI formula, a reduction in the maximum rental rate corresponds to an increase in the cost weight in terms of the impact on the relative scores (and thus the ranking) of the bids, which would also lead to improvements in efficiency. These results suggest that the efficiency gain from the reduced rental rates and better ranking of bids outweighs the cost of a smaller pool, making a reduction in the maximum allowable rental rate efficiency-enhancing.
The efficiency-equity tradeoff curve faced by CRP administrators as they reduce the county enrollment cap is also presented in figure 4 . The result indicates that CRP efficiency is highly sensitive to changes in the county enrollment cap. Specifically, reducing the county enrollment cap would greatly reduce the program's efficiency without significantly improving its distributional equity according to any of the equity indicators. The reason for this result is that benefit-cost ratios for bids from counties with CRP enrollments close to the 25% cap are among the highest for all bids. Reducing CRP land in those counties would result in a significant efficiency loss.
Paths to the Optimal Allocation
We examine fund reallocations for achieving alternative combinations of efficiency and equity on the EEF, including (a) the most efficient allocation; (b) the most equitable allocation (given the distribution of the eligible land); (c) the allocation that achieves higher efficiency without compromising equity (vertical move to the EEF); (d) the win-win allocation (to move to the closest point on the EEF with both higher efficiency and higher equity); and (e) the allocation that achieves higher equity without compromising efficiency (horizontal move to the EEF). Figure 5 shows the reallocations of CRP dollars to achieve scenarios (a) to (d) for the equity-in-outcome indicator 1. Panel a) in figure 5 shows the redistribution of CRP dollars for achieving the most efficient allocation. Counties in the light grey areas would lose CRP funding, while counties in the dark grey area would gain. The light grey areas include southern lake states and most of the Corn Belt, and some wheatgrowing regions in the Pacific Northwest. Although land retirement in some light grey areas generates a large amount of environmental benefit per acre, it also requires high rental payments because land tends to be productive in those areas. Most of the counties that gain funding are located in the North Mountain and the Great Plains. Compared with benefit-cost ratio targeting, EBI gives a smaller weight to rental costs. This leads to too much CRP land in the light grey area under the current definition of environmental benefit scores.
Panel b) in figure 5 shows the redistribution of CRP dollars that would result in the most equitable point on the EFF. The shifting of CRP dollars is almost reversed from the one that tries to reach the highest efficiency, although counties losing CRP dollars are more spatially scattered in this case.
As shown in panel c) of figure 5, the CRP can achieve higher efficiency without compromising much equity by allocating less funding to the Corn Belt and southern lake states, where rental rates are relatively high. Rather, it can achieve higher equity without A win-win improvement is also possible, as shown by panel d) of figure 5 ; the CRP can improve both its efficiency and equity performance by reducing CRP acres in counties with the highest rental rates in the Corn Belt and lake states, and in counties with the highest CRP concentrations in the Northern and Southern Plains.
Conclusions
There is strong evidence that the CRP generates significant economic and environmental benefits to society and these benefits outweigh the cost to taxpayers (Wu and Weber 2012) . Nevertheless, the 2014 Farm Bill reduced the CRP acreage cap substantially, from a historical high of 37 million acres to 24 million acres in 2017. With higher commodity prices and an increased emphasis on working land programs, a large portion of expiring CRP contracts may not be renewed. Thus, it is critically important to understand the tradeoffs and consequences when selecting new contracts or expiring contracts for renewal. This paper develops an analytical framework for analyzing efficiency-equity tradeoffs in targeting payments for ecosystem services and applies it to the CRP, the largest PES program in U.S. history. We analyze what the choice made by CRP administrators implies about the political-economic balance, and whether it is possible to improve both efficiency and political equity of the program. We also propose an empirical procedure for tracing EEFs, where the program is optimal in the sense that it cannot be redesigned to achieve higher efficiency or higher distributional equity without compromising the other. The procedure can be used to determine the reallocations needed to achieve alternative optimal allocations on the EEF.
For a real world program, the CRP performed remarkably well in terms of efficiency; it achieved 91% of the maximum environmental benefits, and most of the CRP payments went to the poorest counties. However, the CRP's equity performance is low due to highly uneven spatial distributions of eligible land. In addition, there is room for improving both the program's efficiency and distributional equity. For example, the CRP can achieve higher efficiency without compromising its equity by allocating less funding to the Corn Belt and southern lake states, where rental rates are generally high. Further, the CRP can achieve higher equity without compromising efficiency by allocating less funding to the Northern and Southern Plains where the current CRP land is concentrated. A win-win improvement is also possible; the CRP can achieve both higher efficiency and higher equity by reducing CRP acres in counties with the highest rental rates in the Corn Belt and lake states, and in counties with the highest CRP concentrations in the Northern and Southern Plains. The potential improvements in efficiency and equity cannot be materialized by adjusting the existing policy levers, however.
Our results indicate that CRP administrators faced an efficiency-equity tradeoff under the EBI-based targeting rule. Their selection of weights in the EBI and other policy levers indicates that they forfeited about 9% of efficiency for an 18%-23% improvement in distributional equity, depending on the equity indicator used. Increasing the weight placed on the cost component of the EBI would increase efficiency at the cost of distributional equity; conversely, decreasing the weight placed on the cost component of the EBI would increase distributional equity at the cost of efficiency. Reducing the maximum allowable rental rate would improve efficiency at the cost of distributional equity, while reducing the county enrollment cap would significantly reduce efficiency without generating much improvement in distributional equity.
The issue of efficiency-equity compatibility is not unique to PES; many public programs, such as development and health care programs, face the same issue (Jones 2009 ). The framework and the empirical procedure developed in this study should apply to many other national programs that have efficiency and distributional equity as policy goals. However, it should be noted that our approach is data-intensive because it requires data on individual bids or alternative investment opportunities. Such data may not always be available. In addition, the pool of bids or conservation investment opportunities may be endogenous to conservation-targeting criteria. It would be interesting to test if and how farmers would respond to changes in targeting criteria and how the responses would affect efficiency-equity tradeoffs in future research.
Environmental Benefit Index
The Environmental Benefit Index (EBI) is composed of two main components: a benefit score, which sums up environmental benefits from six categories ( P 6 i¼1 N i ), and a cost score, which is a function of the requested rental payment r (h r ð ÞÞ (Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008; Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005) :
Environmental Benefit Factors N 1 -Wildlife Factor (0-100 points): measures the expected wildlife benefits of the offer. It is based on the vegetation cover practices, importance to endangered species, proximity to water, protected areas, wetland, and upland cover. N 2 -Water Quality Factors (0-100 points): measures the expected water quality benefits of the offer. The score is assigned based on proximity to protected areas and the quality of ground water and surface water.
N 3 -Erosion Factor (0-100 points): measures the expected benefits from spoil erosion reduction. The erosion factor is proportional to the erodibility of the land.
N 4 -Enduring Benefits Factor (0-50 points): evaluates the likelihood of conservation practices to remain in place beyond the contract period.
N 5 -Air Quality Benefits from Reduced Wind Erosion (0-35 points): evaluates the air quality improvements from reducing airborne dust and particulates from cropland by wind erosion. It is proportional to the wind erodibility of the land and distance-weighted population that could be affected. N 6 -State or National Conservation Priority Areas (CPA) (0-25 points): measures additional environmental benefits gained by protecting land in a CPA. If at least 51% of the acreage offered is located within a CPA and certain other criteria are met, twenty-five points are awarded.
Cost Score
The cost score is calculated by: ðA2Þ h r ð Þ ¼ w 1 À r=max:r ð Þþ10 Â 1 À s ð Þ þ minð15; r m À rÞ where w is set at the government's discretion, which is 125 for Signup 18, r is the farm requested rent per acre, max:r is the highest rental rate allowed for all contracts, r m is the parcel's soil-based maximum rent, and s is the farmer's decision on cost-sharing. If the farmer elects to share costs (s¼1), the government pays for half of the cost eligible for cost sharing; otherwise the farmer gets rewarded by 10 EBI points. The last term is the additional points, up to 15, rewarded to the farmer if the requested rent is below r m . Although the EBI-based targeting has advantages over cost or benefit targeting, it has some major limitations. First, the EBI captures only a portion of environmental benefits from land retirement. Pollination services, reduced flood damage, greenhouse gas reductions, etc., are not captured by the EBI because they are not included in the objective of the CRP as stated in the statute. Second, the EBI may not accurately predict ex post benefits. For example, the EBI treats one point from erosion reduction as equivalent to one point of wildlife habitat. There is a programmatic justification for this treatment: the statute gives them equal weight. Unless the points are assigned based on the values of environmental benefits, there is no economic support for this treatment. Finally, the EBI treats the value of these environmental goods as a linear function. The benefit function is likely nonlinear because of threshold effects, benefit spillovers, and complexities of ecosystems linkages (Alpizar et al. 2013; Robalino and Pfaff 2012) .
